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a b s t r a c t
Attribute-based encryption (ABE), as introduced by Sahai and Waters, allows for fine-
grained access control on encrypted data. In its key-policy flavor (the dual ciphertext-
policy scenario proceeds the other way around), the primitive enables senders to encrypt
messages under a set of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures
that specify which ciphertexts the key holder will be allowed to decrypt. In most ABE
systems, the ciphertext size grows linearlywith the number of ciphertext attributes and the
only knownexception only supports restricted formsof access policies. This paper proposes
the first attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes allowing for truly expressive access
structures andwith constant ciphertext size. Our first result is a ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) schemewith O(1)-size ciphertexts for threshold access policies
and where private keys remain as short as in previous systems. As a second result, we
show that a certain class of identity-based broadcast encryption schemes generically
yields monotonic key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) systems in the selective
set model. Our final contribution is a KP-ABE realization supporting non-monotonic
access structures (i.e., that may contain negated attributes) with short ciphertexts. As an
intermediate step toward this result, we describe a new efficient identity-based revocation
mechanism that, when combined with a particular instantiation of our general monotonic
construction, gives rise to the most expressive KP-ABE realization with constant-size
ciphertexts. The downside of our second and third constructions is that private keys have
quadratic size in the number of attributes. On the other hand, they reduce the number of
pairing evaluations to a constant, which appears to be a unique feature among expressive
KP-ABE schemes.
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1. Introduction
It frequently happens that sensitive data must be archived by storage servers in such a way that only specific parties are
allowed to read the content. In these situations, enforcing the access control using ordinary public key encryption schemes
is not very convenient as such primitives severely decrease the flexibility of users to share their data.
To address these concerns, Sahai and Waters [34] introduced attribute-based encryption (ABE), which refines identity-
based encryption [35,10] by associating ciphertexts and private keys with sets of descriptive attributes. Decryption is then
possible when there is a sufficient overlap between the two sets. These results were extended by Goyal et al. [24] into richer
kinds of attribute-based encryption, where decryption is permitted when the attribute set satisfies a more complex Boolean
formula specified by an access structure. This paper describes truly expressive ABE systems featuring compact ciphertexts,
regardless of the number of underlying attributes.
Related Work. Attribute-based encryption comes in two flavors. In key-policy ABE schemes (KP-ABE), attribute sets are
used to annotate ciphertexts and private keys are associated with access structures that specify which ciphertexts the user
will be entitled to decrypt. Ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) proceeds in the dual way, by assigning attribute sets to private
keys and letting senders specify an access policy that receivers’ attribute sets should comply with.
The ciphertext-policy scenario was first studied in [6,20]. The construction of Cheung and Newport [20] only handles
AND gates while the first expressive construction [6] was only analyzed in the generic group model. Goyal et al. [25]
gave a construction in the standard model but its large parameters and key sizes make it impractical for reasonably
expressive policies. Efficient and expressive realizations in the standard model were subsequently put forth by Waters
[37] and one of them was recently extended by Lewko et al. [29], and subsequently by Okamoto and Takashima [36],
into schemes providing adaptive security whereas all prior works on ABE were limited to deal with selective adversaries
[15,16,7] – who have to make up their mind about their target before having seen public parameters – in their security
analysis.
In both CP-ABE and KP-ABE schemes, expressivity requires to go beyond what monotonic access structures can express.
Ostrovsky, Sahai andWaters [32] considered access structures that may contain negative attributes without blowing up the
size of shares or ciphertexts. Their initial constructionwas recently improved by Lewko et al. [28] who used techniques from
revocation systems (which can be seen as negative analogues of identity-based broadcast encryption) to design the most
efficient non-monotonic KP-ABE to date.
Our Contributions. So far, the research community hasmostly focused on the design of expressive schemes –where access
structures can implement as complex Boolean formulas as possible – without trying to minimize the size of ciphertexts.
Indeed, most schemes [24,32,37,29,28] feature linear-size ciphertexts in the maximal number of attributes that ciphertexts
can be annotated with. In the ciphertext-policy setting, Emura et al. suggested a scheme with short ciphertexts [23] but, as
in the Cheung–Newport realization [20], policies are restricted to a single AND gate.
This paper aims at devising ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts1 (regardless of the number of underlying
attributes) allowing for as expressive policies as possible. To this end, we propose several tradeoffs in terms of efficiency
and expressivity.
Our first result is to design a CP-ABE system for threshold policies (namely, decryption works if the ciphertext and the
receiver’s private key have at least t attributes in common, where the threshold t is specified by the sender) with constant-
size ciphertexts and where the private key size is linear in the number of attributes held by the user. The scheme belongs to
the ciphertext-policy family in that the sender has the flexibility of choosing the threshold as he likes. The security is proved
against selective adversaries under a non-interactive assumption.
As a second contribution, we show that a certain class of identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) schemes readily
yields KP-ABE schemes with monotonic (though LSSS-realizable) access structures via a generic transformation. The latter
preserves the ciphertext size and guarantees the resulting scheme to be selectively secure (as defined in [15,7]) as long as
the underlying IBBE system is itself selectively secure. At the expense of quadratic-size private keys (which comprise O(t ·n)
elements, where n is the maximal number of ciphertext attributes and t is the maximal number of leaf attributes in access
trees), this transformation directly provides us with monotonic KP-ABE schemes with O(1)-size ciphertexts.
In a third step, we use a particular output of the aforementioned transformation to design a scheme supporting non-
monotonic access structureswithout sacrificing the efficiency. In the resulting construction, the ciphertext overhead reduces
to three group elements, no matter how many attributes ciphertexts are associated with. As in the monotonic case, private
keys are inflated by a factor of n in comparison with [32,28]. Nevertheless, these new schemes remain attractive for
applications where bandwidth is the primary concern. In mobile Internet connections for instance, users are charged
depending on the amount of transmitted messages; while in contrast, the storage is becoming much cheaper nowadays
even for a large amount, as evidently in many smart phones.
As an intermediate step toward thenewnon-monotonic KP-ABE scheme,wedesign anew identity-based revocation (IBR)
mechanism (as defined by Lewko et al. [28]) with O(1)-size ciphertexts and a similar structure to that of the monotonic KP-
ABE schemes provided by our general construction. This was necessary since prior IBR systems with short ciphertexts [4]
1 As in the literature on broadcast encryption (see, e.g., [11]) where the list of receivers is not included in the ciphertext, we do not count the description
of ciphertext attributes as being part of the ciphertext. Indeed, many ciphertexts may have to be encrypted under the same attribute set.
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were not directly amenable to fulfill these requirements. We believe this new IBR realization to be of independent interest
since it performs noticeably better than previous schemes featuring short ciphertexts [4] and still relies a natural (though
‘‘q-type’’) intractability assumption.
The security of our schemes is proved against selective adversaries (that are not allowed to choose their target attribute
set adaptively) under a non-interactive assumption. We leave it as an open problem to obtain ABE schemes with compact
ciphertexts that can be proven secure against adaptive adversaries (as in the work of Lewko et al. [29]).
Other RelatedWork. The aforementioned realizations all assume ABE schemeswith a single authority andwe focus on this
context as well. Extensions to the multi-authority scenario were investigated in [17,18] for a conjunctive setting and in [3]
for a disjunctive setting. Besides the two usual flavors of ABE, another recently considered kind of ABE schemes [2], called
dual-policy ABE, mixes features from both KP-ABE and CP-ABE systems.
Organization. In the following, we first review various primitives in Section 2. Our CP-ABE scheme for threshold policies
is described in Section 3. We describe our general construction of monotonic KP-ABE in Section 4. The new revocation
scheme is depicted in Section 5.1, whereas the new non-monotonic ABE realization with compact ciphertexts is presented
in Section 5.2.We compare the efficiency of some non-monotonic KP-ABE schemes in Section 5.3. Some concluding remarks
and open problems are given in Section 6.
2. Background and definitions
Notation.We will treat a vector as a column vector, unless stated otherwise. Namely, for any vector α⃗ = (α1, . . . , αn)⊤ ∈
Znp , g
α⃗ stands for the vector of group elements (gα1 , . . . , gαn)⊤ ∈ Gn. For a⃗, z⃗ ∈ Znp , we denote their inner product as
⟨a⃗, z⃗⟩ = a⃗⊤z⃗ = ni=1 aizi. Given g a⃗ and z⃗, (g a⃗)z⃗ := g ⟨a⃗,z⃗⟩ is computable without knowing a⃗. We denote by In the identity
matrix of size n. For a set U , we define 2U = {S | S ⊆ U} and  U
<k
 = {S | S ⊆ U, |S| < k} for k ≤ |U|.
2.1. Secret sharing schemes
In this section we recall the definitions of access structures and linear secret sharing schemes, as defined in [24].
Definition 1 (Access Structures). Consider a set of partiesP = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}. A collection A ⊆ 2P is said to be monotone
if, for all ω,ω′, if ω ∈ A and ω′ ⊆ ω, then ω ∈ A. An access structure (resp., monotonic access structure) is a collection
(resp., monotone collection) A ⊆ 2P \ {∅}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the
unauthorized sets.
Threshold access structures are a specific case which appears very often in the cryptographic literature.
Definition 2 (Threshold Access Structure). An access structureA is said to be a threshold access structure if there exists some
positive integer tA such that ω ∈ A if and only if |w| ≥ tA.
An important notion related to that of access structures in the notion of minimal sets in the access structure.
Definition 3 (Minimal Set). Given some access structure A ⊆ 2P , ω ∈ A is a minimal set if and only if any subset ω′ ⊂ ω is
not authorized, that is, ω′ /∈ A.
Finally, we will need the notion of linear secret sharing schemes.
Definition 4 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Let P be a set of parties. Let L be a ℓ × k matrix with entries in Zp together
with an injective function π : {1, . . . , ℓ} → P which maps a row to a party for labeling. ThenΠ = (L, π) is a linear secret
sharing scheme (LSSS) in Zp for the access structureA over a set of partiesP if, for every setω ⊂ P , the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0)
is in the Zp-linear span of the rows of L labeled by the elements of ω if and only if ω ∈ A. In this case,Π = (L, π) consists
of two efficient algorithms:
Share(L,π): takes as input s ∈ Zp which is to be shared. It randomly chooses β2, . . . , βk R← Zp and let β⃗ = (s, β2, . . . , βk)⊤.
It outputs L · β⃗ as the vector of ℓ shares. The share λi := ⟨L⃗i, β⃗⟩ belongs to party π(i), where L⃗i⊤ is the ith row of L.
Recon(L,π): takes as input a setω ∈ A. Let I = {i| π(i) ∈ S}. It outputs a set of constants {(i, µi)}i∈I such thati∈I µi ·λi = s.
An access structure A is said LSSS-realizable if there exists a LSSS for A.
2.2. Syntax and security definition for functional encryption
We capture notions of KP-ABE, IBBE, IBR by providing a unified definition and security notion for functional encryption2
here and then instantiating to these primitives in the next subsections.
2 The term ‘‘functional encryption’’ was defined in slightly different manners in [29,4,36] before recently fully formalized in [13]. Our definition of FE
here and throughout the paper refers to the class of predicate encryption with public index of [13].
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Syntax. Let R : Σk×Σe → {0, 1} be a Boolean functionwhereΣk andΣe denote ‘‘key index’’ and ‘‘ciphertext index’’ spaces.
A functional encryption (FE) scheme for the relation R consists of algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt.
Setup(λ, des)→ (mpk,msk): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and a scheme description des and
outputs a master public keympk and a master secret keymsk.
KeyGen(msk, X)→ SKX : The key generation algorithm takes in the master secret key msk and a key index X ∈ Σk. It
outputs a private key SKX .
Encrypt(mpk,M, Y )→ C: This algorithm takes as input a public keympk, the messageM, and a ciphertext index Y ∈ Σe.
It outputs a ciphertext C .
Decrypt(mpk,SKX , X, C, Y )→ M or⊥: The decryption algorithm takes in the public parameters mpk, a private key SKX
for the key index X and a ciphertext C for the ciphertext index Y . It outputs themessageM or a symbol⊥ indicating
that the ciphertext is not in a valid form.
Correctness mandates that, for all λ, all (mpk,msk) produced by Setup(λ, des), all X ∈ Σk, all keys SKX returned by
KeyGen(msk, X) and all Y ∈ Σe,
− If R(X, Y ) = 1, then Decrypt(mpk,SKX , X, Encrypt(mpk,M, Y ), Y ) = M.
− If R(X, Y ) = 0, then Decrypt(mpk,SKX , X, Encrypt(mpk,M, Y ), Y ) = ⊥.
Security Notion. We now give the standard security definition for FE schemes. Constructions satisfying this security
property are sometimes called payload hiding in the literature.
A stronger property, called attribute-hiding, guarantees that ciphertexts additionally hide their underlying attributes Y
and it will not be considered here. To date, this property has only been obtained (e.g., [27]) for access policies that are less
expressive than those considered in this paper. We henceforth consider FE systems with public index (according to the
terminology of [13]), where ciphertext attributes Y are public.
Definition 5. A FE scheme for relation R is fully secure (or payload-hiding) if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversaryA has non-negligible advantage in this game:
Setup. The challenger runs (mpk,msk)← Setup(λ, des) and givesmpk toA.
Phase 1. On polynomially-many occasions, the adversary A chooses a key index X and obtains a private key SKX =
Keygen(msk, X). Such queries can be adaptive in that each one may depend on the information gathered so far.
Challenge. A chooses messages M0,M1 and a ciphertext index Y ⋆ such that R(X, Y ⋆) = 0 for all key indexes X that
have been queried at Phase 1. Then, the challenger flips a fair binary coin σ ∈ {0, 1}, generates a ciphertext C⋆ =
Encrypt(mpk,Mσ , Y ⋆), and hands it to the adversary.
Phase 2. A is allowed to make more key generation queries for any key index X such that R(X, Y ⋆) = 0.
Guess. A outputs a bit σ ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if σ ′ = σ .
The advantage of the adversaryA is measured by Adv(λ) := |Pr[σ ′ = σ ] − 12 | where the probability is taken over all coin
tosses.
Aweaker notion called selective security [15,7] can be defined as in the above gamewith the exception that the adversary
A has to choose the challenge ciphertext index Y ⋆ before the setup phase but private key queries X1, . . . , Xq can still be
adaptive. A dual notion called co-selective security [4], in contrast, requires A to declare q key queries for key indexes
X1, . . . , Xq before the setup phase, butA can adaptively choose the target challenge ciphertext index Y ⋆.
2.3. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
In a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme, ciphertexts are associated with access structures over the
subsets of at most n attributes of the space of attributes, for some specified n ∈ N. Decryption works only if the attribute set
ω associated to a certain secret key is authorized in the access structure A (i.e., ω ∈ A). We formally define it as an instance
of FE as follows.
Definition 6 (CP-ABE). Let U be an attribute space. Given some n ∈ N, letAS be any collection of access structures over U
such that for any A ∈ AS, there exists some subset B ⊂ U with |B| ≤ n and such that every minimal set ω of A satisfies
that ω ⊂ B. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) for the collection AS is a functional encryption for
RCP : 2U ×AS→ {0, 1} defined by RCP(ω,A) = 1 iff ω ∈ A (for any ω ⊆ U and A ∈ AS). Furthermore, the description des
consists of the attribute universe U and the bound n, whereasΣCPk = 2U andΣCPe = AS.
Our construction is only for threshold access structures, i.e. when each access structure A in the collection AS is of the
threshold type, and admits also some weighted threshold access structures, as we discuss in Section 3.4.
2.4. Key-policy attribute-based encryption
Compared with its ciphertext-policy counterpart, in a key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme, access structures
and attributes play a dual role. In this case, ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes ω and private keys correspond
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to access structures A. Decryption is also only possible when the attribute set ω is authorized in the access structure A. The
formal definition as an instance of FE is the following.
Definition 7 (KP-ABE). Let U be an attribute space. Let n ∈ N be a bound on the number of attributes per ciphertext. A
key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) for a collectionAS of access structures over U is a functional encryption for
RKP : AS ×  U
<n
 → {0, 1} defined by RKP(A, ω) = 1 iff ω ∈ A (for ω ⊆ U such that |ω| < n, and A ∈ AS). Furthermore,
the description des consists of the attribute universe U and the bound n, whereasΣKPk = AS andΣKPe =
 U
<n

.
Definition 7 conforms with the original definition of KP-ABE, as in [24,32,28,29,13]. There is another variant of KP-ABE
recently used in [36], that we call KP-ABE with labeling. We re-formalize it in Appendix A, for the purpose of comparison in
Table 2. We remark that normal KP-ABE implies KP-ABE with labeling.
We note that chosen-ciphertext secure versions of our proposed KP-ABE schemes in this paper can be obtained from
recent generic results [38].
2.5. Identity-based broadcast encryption and revocation scheme
An ID-based broadcast encryption, as formalized in [1], allows a sender to encrypt a message to a set of identities, say
S = {ID1, . . . , IDq}, where q < n for some a-priori fixed bound n ∈ N, so that a user who possesses a key for ID ∈ S can
decrypt. In contrast, an ID-based revocation scheme [28] allows a sender to specify a revoked set S so that only a user with
ID ∉ S can decrypt.
Definition 8. Let I be an identity space. An ID-based broadcast encryption scheme (IBBE) with themaximal bound n for the
number of receivers per ciphertext is a functional encryption for RIBBE : I ×  I
<n
 → {0, 1} defined by RIBBE(ID, S) = 1 iff
ID ∈ S.
Definition 9. Let I be an identity space. An ID-based revocation (IBR) with the maximal bound n for the number of revoked
users per ciphertext is a functional encryption for RIBR : I×  I
<n
→ {0, 1} defined by RIBR(ID, S) = 1 iff ID ∉ S.
Remark 10. Although selective and co-selective security are incomparable in general, we remark that, in IBR schemes, co-
selective security implies selective security. To see why, we first recall that selective security for IBR requires the adversary
A to declare the target revoked set S⋆ before seeing the public key mpk. Here, phase 1 can be simplified by letting the
challenger hand over all the private keys for identities in S⋆ at once (along with mpk). On the other hand, co-selective IBR
security requiresA to declare the set S˜ of identities thatwill be queried for private key generation before seeingmpkwhereas
the target revocation set S⋆ does not have to be fully determined before the challenge phase. At the same time asmpk, the
challenger then reveals all keys for identities in S˜ at once. Later, the adversary can choose any S⋆ ⊆ S˜ in the challenge phase.
Selective security corresponds to the special case where S⋆ = S˜.
2.6. Bilinear maps and complexity assumptions
Weuse groups (G,GT ) of prime order pwith an efficiently computablemapping e : G×G→ GT s.t. e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab
for any (g, h) ∈ G× G, a, b ∈ Z and e(g, h) ≠ 1GT whenever g, h ≠ 1G.
2.6.1. The decision bilinear Diffie–Hellman exponent problem
We rely on the DBDHE assumption introduced in [11]. This assumption is shown to hold in the generic group model [8].
In addition, it is non-interactive and falsifiable [30].
Definition 11. In (G,GT ), the q-Decision Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Exponent (q-DBDHE) problem is, given a tuple
(g, gγ , g(γ
2), . . . , g(γ
q), g(γ
q+2), . . . , g(γ
2q), h, T )
where γ
R← Zp, g, h R← G and T ∈R GT , to decide if T = e(g, h)(γ q+1) or if T is a random element of GT . The advantage
Advq-DBDHEG,GT (λ) of a distinguisherB is measured by the distancePr[B(g, gγ , . . . , g(γ q), g(γ q+2), . . . , g(γ 2q), h, e(g, h)(γ q+1)) = 1|α R← Zp, h R← G]
−Pr[B(g, gγ , . . . , g(γ q), g(γ q+2), . . . , g(γ 2q), h, T ) = 1|α R← Zp, h R← G, T R← GT ]

where probabilities are taken over the random choice of g, h, γ , T and the distinguisherB’s coins.
2.6.2. The augmented multi-sequence of the exponents Diffie–Hellman problem
The security of our first scheme relies on the hardness of a problem that we call the augmented multi-sequence of
exponents decisional Diffie–Hellman problem, which is a slight modification of the multi-sequence of exponents decisional
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Diffie–Hellman problem considered in [22]. The generic complexity of these two problems is covered by the analysis in [8],
because the problems fit their general Diffie–Hellman exponent problem framework.
Let ℓ˜, m˜, t˜ be three integers. In bilinear groups (G,GT ), the (ℓ˜, m˜, t˜)-augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional
Diffie–Hellman problem ((ℓ˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-DDH) is as follows:
Input: the vector −→x ℓ˜+m˜ = (x1, . . . , xℓ˜+m˜) whose components are pairwise distinct elements of Z⋆p which define the
polynomials
f (X) =
ℓ˜
i=1
(X + xi) and g(X) =
ℓ˜+m˜
i=ℓ˜+1
(X + xi),
the values
g0, g
γ
0 , . . . , g
γ ℓ˜+t˜−2
0 , g
κ·γ ·f (γ )
0 , (l.1)
gβγ0 , . . . , g
βγ ℓ˜+t˜−2
0 , (l.2)
gα0 , g
αγ
0 , . . . , g
αγ ℓ˜+t˜
0 , (l.3)
h0, h
γ
0 , . . . , h
γ m˜−2
0 , h
κ·g(γ )
0 (l.4)
hβ0 , h
βγ
0 , . . . , h
βγ m˜−1
0 , (l.5)
hα0 , h
αγ
0 , . . . , h
αγ 2(m˜−t˜)+3
0 (l.6)
where κ, α, γ , β are unknown random elements of Z⋆p, and finally an element T ∈ GT .
Output: a bit b.
The problem is correctly solved if the output is b = 1 when T = e(g0, h0)κ·f (γ ) or if the output is b = 0 when T is a
random value from GT . In other words, the goal is to distinguish if T is a random value or if it is equal to e(g0, h0)κ·f (γ ).
More formally, let us denote by real the event that T is indeed equal to T = e(g0, h0)κ·f (γ ), by random the event that T
is a random element from GT and by I(
−→x ℓ˜+m˜, κ, α, γ , β, T ) the input of the problem. Then, we define the advantage of an
algorithmB in solving the (ℓ˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-DDH problem as
Adv(ℓ˜,m˜,t˜)-aMSE-DDHB (λ) =
 Pr B(I(−→x ℓ˜+m˜, κ, α, γ , β, T )) = 1real
− Pr B(I(−→x ℓ˜+m˜, κ, α, γ , β, T )) = 1random 
where the probability is taken over all random choices and over the random coins ofB.
The only difference with the multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie–Hellman problem from [22] is the presence
in the input of two additional lines (l.2) and (l.5). The generic hardness of this problem is a consequence of Theorem A.2
from [8]. It is stated in the next proposition whose proof follows (almost exactly) that of Corollary 3 in [22].
Proposition 12. For any probabilistic algorithmB making at most qG queries to the oracle that computes the group operations
(in groups G,GT of order p) and the bilinear map e(·, ·), its advantage in solving the aMSE-DDH problem satisfies
Adv(ℓ˜,m˜,t˜)-aMSE-DDHB (λ) ≤
(qG + 2s+ 2)2 · d
2p
where s = 4m˜+ 3ℓ˜+ t˜ + 3 and d = max{2(ℓ˜+ 2), 2(m˜+ 2), 4(m˜− t˜)+ 10}.
3. A CP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts for threshold policies
This section is dedicated to the presentation of our ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme, which works
for threshold decryption policies.
In the decryption process, we will use the algorithm Aggregate of [21,22]. Given a list of values {g rγ+xi , xi}1≤i≤n, where
r, γ ∈ (Zp)⋆ are unknown and xi ≠ xj if i ≠ j, the algorithm computes the value
Aggregate({g rγ+xi , xi}1≤i≤n) = g
rn
i=1(γ+xi) .
using O(n2) exponentiations.
Although the algorithm Aggregate of [21,22] is given for elements inGT , it is immediate to see that it works in any group
of prime order. Running Aggregate for elements in G results in our case in a more efficient decryption algorithm.
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Concretely, the algorithm proceeds by definingΛ0,η = g r/(γ+xη) for each η ∈ {1, . . . , n} and observing that, if we define
Λj,η = g
r
(γ+xη)·ji=1(γ+xi) with 1 ≤ j < η ≤ n,
these values satisfy the recursion formula
Λj,η =
Λj−1,j
Λj−1,η
1/(xη−xj)
. (1)
Therefore, as long as elements x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct, (1) allows sequentially computingΛj,η for j = 1 to n− 1 and
η = j+ 1 to n in order to finally obtainΛn−1,n = g
rn
i=1(γ+xi) .
3.1. Description
I Setup(λ,U, n): the trusted setup algorithm chooses a suitable encoding τ sending each of the m attributes at ∈ U onto
a (different) element τ(at) = x ∈ (Zp)⋆. It also chooses groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ with a bilinear map
e : G × G → GT and generators g, h R← G. Then, it chooses a set D = {d1, . . . , dn−1} consisting of n − 1 pairwise
different elements of (Zp)⋆, which must also be different to the values x = τ(at), for all at ∈ U . For any integer i lower or
equal to n − 1, we denote asDi the set {d1, . . . , di}. Next, the algorithm picks at random α, γ ∈ Z⋆p and sets u = gαγ and
v = e(gα, h). The master secret key is thenmsk = (g, α, γ ) and the public parameters are
mpk =

U, n, u, v,

hαγ
i

i=0,...,2n−1
,D, τ

.
I Keygen(msk, ω): to generate a key for the attribute set ω ⊂ U , pick r, z R← Z∗p and compute the private key
skω =
 
g
r
γ+τ(at)

at∈ω
,

hrγ
i

i=0,...,n−2
, h
r−z
γ , z

.
I Encrypt(mpk, S, t,M): given a subset S ⊂ U with s = |S| attributes, s ≤ n, a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s, and a
messageM ∈ GT , the sender picks at random κ ∈ Z⋆p and computes
C1 = u−κ ,
C2 = hκ·α·

at∈S (γ+τ(at))

d∈Dn+t−1−s (γ+d),
K = vκ = e(gα, h)κ .
The value C2 is computed from the set {hαγ i}i=0,...,2n−1 that can be found in the public parameters. The ciphertext is then
C = (C1, C2, C3), where C3 = K ·M.
I Decrypt(mpk, skω, ω, C, (S, t)): given C = (C1, C2, C3) ∈ G2×GT , any user with a set of attributesω such that |ω∩S| ≥ t
can use the secret key skω to decrypt the ciphertext, as follows. LetωS be any subset ofω∩Swith |ωS | = t . The user computes,
from all at ∈ ωS , the value
Aggregate({g rγ+τ(at) , τ (at)}at∈ωS ) = g
r
at∈ωS (γ+τ(at)) .
With the output of the algorithm Aggregate, the decryption algorithm also computes
χ = e

g
r
at∈ωS (γ+τ(at)) , C2

= e(g, h)κ·α·r·

at∈S\ωS (γ+τ(at))

d∈Dn+t−1−s (γ+d).
For simplicity, let τ(d) = d for all d ∈ D and define P(ωS ,S)(γ ) as
P(ωS ,S)(γ ) =
1
γ
 
y∈(S∪Dn+t−1−s)\ωS
(γ + τ(y))−

y∈(S∪Dn+t−1−s)\ωS
τ(y)

.
The crucial point is that, since |ωS | ≥ t , the degree of the polynomial P(ωS ,S)(X) is lower or equal to n − 2. Therefore, from
the values included in skω , the user can compute h
rP(ωS ,S)(γ ).
After that, the user calculates
e(C1, h
rP(ωS ,S)(γ )) · χ = e(g, h)κ·α·r·

y∈(S∪Dn+t−1−s)\ωS τ(y) (2)
and
e(C1, h
r−z
γ ) = e(g, h)−κ·α·r · e(g, h)κ·α·z (3)
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From Eq. (2), the decryption algorithm obtains
e(g, h)κ·α·r =

e(C1, h
rP(ωS ,S)(γ )) · χ
1/y∈(S∪Dn+t−1−s)\ωS τ(y)
and multiplies this value in Eq. (3). The result of this multiplication leads to e(g, h)κ·α·z . This value is raised to z−1 to obtain
K = e(g, h)κ·α . Finally, the plaintext is recovered by computingM = C3/K .
3.2. Consistency checking and efficiency considerations
It is not hard to prove that the newABE scheme satisfy the correctness property: if all the protocols are correctly executed,
and if |ω ∩ S| ≥ t , then skω allows recovering plaintexts that have been encrypted for the pair (S, t).
It is worth noting that, by adding gα to the public parameters (this modification does not affect the security proof that
we present in the next section), the users can check the consistency of the secret key they receive from the master entity.
To do so, they must verify that, for all their attributes at ∈ ω,
e

g
r
γ+τ(at) , hαγ · (hα)τ(at)

= e gα, hr
and then that, for i = 1, . . . , n− 2,
e

gα, hrγ
i

= e

u, hrγ
i−1
Finally, they have to check that e(u, h
r−z
γ ) = e (gα, hr) /vz .
In terms of efficiency, the main contribution of this new scheme is the constant size of the ciphertext, which consists of
two elements ofG and one element ofGT . Encryption requires no pairing computations, but n+ t + 1 exponentiations. The
decryption process requires 3 pairing evaluations and O(t2 + n) exponentiations. The size of the secret key is linear in the
number of attributes, as in all existing ABE schemes.
3.3. Security
We are going to prove that our scheme is selectively secure, assuming that the aMSE-DDH problem is hard to solve.
Theorem 13. Let λ be an integer. For any adversaryA against the selective security of our CP-ABE scheme, for a universe U of m
attributes and maximal size n ≥ |S˜| for any decryption policy (S˜, t˜), there exists a solverB of the (ℓ˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-DDH problem
such that
AdvaMSE-DDHB (λ) ≥
1
n2
· AdvABE-sCPAA (λ).
Proof. We are going to construct an algorithmB that uses the adversaryA as a black-box and that solves an instance of the
aMSE-DDH problem. The main trick in the proof will be to use the input of the aMSE-DDH problem to compute evaluations
of some polynomials in γ ‘‘in the exponent’’.
B chooses valuesm, n for the size of the universe of attributes U = {at1, . . . , atm} and for the upper bond on the size of
allowed decryption policies. After that,B chooses at random two integers s, t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ n. Then,B asks for an
instance of the (ℓ˜, m˜, t˜)-aMSE-DDH problem, where ℓ˜ = m− s, m˜ = n+ t − 1 and t˜ = t + 1.
Let I(−→x m+n+t−1−s, κ, α, γ , β, T ) be the instance of the problem received by B. Now, B initializes the adversary A
against the selective security of the CP-ABE scheme. The adversary A chooses a set S ⊂ U of cardinal s′ that he wants to
attack, and a threshold t ′ such that 1 ≤ t ′ ≤ s′ ≤ n. If (s′, t ′) ≠ (s, t), thenB aborts and outputs a random bit as the answer
to the aMSE-DDH problem.
Otherwise (that is, if s′ = s and t ′ = t , which happens with probability at least 1/n2), the solver B goes on with the
simulation of the environment of adversaryA.
Without loss of generality, we assume S = {atm−s+1, . . . , atm} ⊂ U . From now on, we will denote byωS the subsetω∩ S,
for any subset of attributes ω.
Simulation of the setup phase. AlgorithmB defines the encoding of the attributes as τ(ati) = xi for i = 1, . . . ,m. Observe
that the encodings of the firstm− s elements are the opposite of the roots of f (X), and the encodings of the attributes in S
are the opposite of some roots of g(X).
The values corresponding to ‘‘dummy’’ attributes D = {d1, . . . , dn−1} are defined as dj = xm+j if j = 1, . . . , n +
t − 1 − s. For j = n + t − s, . . . , n − 1, the dj’s are picked uniformly at random in Z⋆p until they are distinct from{x1, . . . , xm+n+t−1−s, dn+t−s, . . . , dj−1}.
Our algorithm B defines g := g f (γ )0 . Note that B can compute g with the elements of line (l.1) of its input, since f is a
polynomial of degree ℓ˜. To complete the setup phase,B sets h = h0 and computes
• u = gαγ = gα·γ ·f (γ )0 with line (l.3) of its input, which is possible since Xf (X) is a polynomial of degree ℓ˜ + 1. Indeed,
α · γ · f (γ ) is a linear combination of {αγ , . . . , αγ ℓ˜+1} and the coefficients of this linear combination are known to B,
so the value u can be computed from line (l.3).
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• v = e(g, h)α = e(g f (γ )α0 , h0) with line (l.3) for g f (γ )α0 . Note that the value gα could be computed by B and added to the
public parameters, in case the verification of the consistency of the secret keys is desired for the scheme.
AlgorithmB can compute the values {hαγ i}i=0,...,2n−1 from line (l.6) of its input. Eventually,B providesAwith the resulting
master public key
mpk =

U, n, u, v, {hαγ i}i=0,...,2n−1,D, τ

.
Simulation of key extraction queries.Whenever the adversary A makes a key extraction query for a subset of attributes
ω ⊂ U satisfying that 0 ≤ |ωS | ≤ t − 1, the algorithmB must produce a tuple of the form
skω =
 
g
r
γ+τ(at)

at∈ω
,

hrγ
i

i=0,...,n−2
, h
r−z
γ , z

,
for some random values r, z ∈ Z⋆p. To do so, B chooses z ∈ Z⋆p uniformly at random and implicitly defines r =
(β · yω · γ + z) · Qω(γ ), where yω is randomly picked in Z⋆p, and the polynomial Qω(X) is defined as Qω(γ ) = 1 when
|ωS | = 0, or Qω(X) = λω · 
at∈ωS
(X + τ(at)) otherwise, in which case λω = (at∈ωS τ(at))−1.
The rest of elements (other than z) which form skω are then computed as follows:
• For any at ∈ ωS ,B defines
Qat(γ ) = Qω(γ )/(γ + τ(at)) = λω ·

a˜t∈ωS , a˜t≠at
(γ + τ(a˜t)).
Then g
r
γ+τ(at) = g f (γ )·β·yω ·γ ·Qat(γ )0 · gz·f (γ )·Qat(γ )0 . The first factor of the product (whose exponent is a polynomial in γ of
degree at most (m − s) + 1 + t − 2) can be computed from line (l.2), whereas the second factor (whose exponent is a
polynomial in γ of degree at most (m− s)+ t − 2) can be computed from line (l.1).
• For any attribute at ∈ ω \ ωS , B defines the polynomial fat(X) = f (X)/(X + τ(at)) and considers the product
g
r
γ+τ(at) = g fat(γ )·β·yω ·γ ·Qω(γ )0 · gz·fat(γ )·Qω(γ )0 . Again, the first factor of this product can be computed from line (l.2), and
the second factor can be computed from line (l.1).
• The values

hrγ
i

i=0,...,n−2
can be computed from line (l.4) and (l.5), since
hrγ
i = hQω(γ )·β·yω ·γ i+1 · hz·Qω(γ )·γ i .
• Finally, B has to compute h r−zγ = hQω(γ )·β·yω · h z·Qω(γ )−zγ . The first factor of the product can be computed from line (l.5)
and the second factor can be computed from line (l.4), since by definition of λω , Qω(X) is a polynomial with independent
term equal to 1 and thus zQω(γ )−z
γ
is a linear combination of {1, γ , . . . , γ t−2}.
Note that Qω(γ ) ≠ 0 (otherwise γ = τ(at) for some at ∈ ωS and γ is public), in which case it is not hard to see that r
is uniformly distributed in Zp. If the choice of yω leads to r = 0 (which occurs only with negligible probability anyhow), it
suffices to pick a different value for yω . That is, in the simulation r is uniformly distributed in Z⋆p.
Challenge. Once A sends to B the two messages M0 and M1, B flips a coin σ
R← {0, 1} and sets C⋆3 = T · Mσ . To
simulate the rest of the challenge ciphertext, B implicitly defines the randomness for the encryption as κ ′ = κ/α, and
sets C⋆2 = hκ·g(γ )0 (given in line (l.4) of the aMSE-DDH input). To complete the generation of the challenge ciphertext, B
computes C⋆1 =

gκ·γ f (γ )0
−1
from (l.1) of the input, which is equal to u−κ ′ .
After the challenge stepAmay make other key extraction queries, which are answered as before.
Guess. Finally, A outputs a bit σ ′. If σ ′ = σ , B answers 1 as the solution to the given instance of the aMSE-DDH problem,
meaning that T = e(g0, h0)κ·f (γ ). Otherwise,B answers 0, meaning that T is a random element.
We now have to analyze the advantage of the distinguisherB. IfB’s guess of the values s and t was always correct, then
we would have:
AdvaMSE-DDHB (λ) =
 Pr B(I(−→x ℓ˜+m˜, κ, α, γ , β, T )) = 1real−
Pr

B(I(
−→x ℓ˜+m˜, κ, α, γ , β, T )) = 1
random 
=
 Pr σ = σ ′real− Pr σ = σ ′random .
When real occurs,A is playing a real attack and we have | Pr σ = σ ′real− 1/2| = AdvIND-sCPAA,Π (λ). During the random
event, A’s view is completely independent of the bit σ ∈ {0, 1}, so that we have Pr[σ = σ ′|random] = 1/2. Combining
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these arguments with the fact thatB’s guess of the values s and t is actually correct with some probability at least 1/n2, we
obtain
AdvaMSE-DDHB (λ) ≥
1
n2
· AdvABE-sCPAA,Π (λ). 
3.4. More general decryption policies
Although we have considered in this paper the special case of threshold decryption policies, attribute-based encryption
schemes can be defined for general decryption policies. Such a policy is determined by amonotone increasing familyA ⊂ 2U
of subsets of attributes, in U = {at1, . . . , atm}. This family (or access structure) is chosen by the sender at the time of
encryption, in such a way that only users whose subset of attributes ω belong to A can decrypt. Even if many users collude,
each of them having a subset of attributes out of A, the encryption scheme must remain secure.
The threshold ABE scheme that we have described and analyzed in this paper is inspired on the dynamic threshold
identity-based encryption scheme of [22]. It is claimed in [22] that the threshold scheme there can be extended to admit
‘‘all the classical cases’’ of more general access structures. However, this is not completely true, because their extension only
applies to a sub family of access structures,weighted threshold ones. A familyA ⊂ 2U is aweighted threshold access structure
if there exist a threshold t and an assignment of weights wt : U → Z+ such that ω ∈ A⇐⇒at∈ω wt(at) ≥ t . Of course,
there are many access structures which are not weighted threshold, for example A = {{at1, at2}, {at2, at3}, {at3, at4}} in the
set U = {at1, at2, at3, at4}.
The same extension proposed in [22] works for our threshold ABE scheme. Let K be an upper bound for wt(at), for all
at ∈ U and for all possible assignments of weights that realize weighted threshold decryption policies. During the setup
of the ABE scheme, the new universe of attributes will be U ′ = {at1||1, at1||2, . . . , at1||K , . . . , atm||1, . . . , atm||K}. During
the secret key request phase, if an attribute at belongs to the requested subset ω ⊂ U , the secret key skω will contain the
elements g
r
γ+τ(at(j)) corresponding to at(j) = at||j, for all j = 1, . . . , K .
Later, suppose a sender wants to encrypt a message for a weighted threshold decryption policy A, defined on a subset
of attributes S = {at1, . . . , ats} (without loss of generality). Let t and wt : S → Z+ be the threshold and assignment of
weights that realize A. The sender can use the threshold ABE encryption routine described in Section 3.1, with threshold t ,
but applied to the set of attributes S ′ = {at1||1, . . . , at1||wt(at1), . . . , ats||1, . . . , ats||wt(ats)}. In this way, if a user holds a
subset of attributes ω ∈ A, he will have wt(at) valid elements in his secret key, for each attribute at ∈ ω. In total, he will
have

at∈ω wt(at) ≥ t valid elements, so he will be able to run the decryption routine of the threshold ABE scheme and
decrypt the ciphertext.
The security analysis can be extended to this more general case, as well. Therefore, we can conclude that our ABE scheme
with constant size ciphertexts also admits weighted threshold decryption policies.
3.5. Delegation of secret keys and security under chosen ciphertext attacks
Our attribute-based encryption scheme admits delegation of secret keys: from a valid secret key skω = 
g
r
γ+τ(at)

at∈ω
,

hrγ
i

i=0,...,n−2
, h
r−z
γ , z

it is possible to compute a valid secret key skω′ for any subsetω′ ⊂ ω, as follows:
take ρ ∈ Z⋆p at random and compute
skω′ =
 
g
r
γ+τ(at)
ρ
at∈ω′
,

hrγ
i
ρ
i=0,...,n−2
,

h
r−z
γ
ρ
, z · ρ

.
Our ABE scheme can be therefore viewed as a hierarchical ABE scheme with the natural hierarchy: a user holding
attributes ω is over a user holding attributes ω′, if ω′ ⊂ ω. Then, the techniques developed in [16] can be applied to
transform our hierarchical ABE scheme, which enjoys selective security under chosen plaintext attacks, into an ABE scheme
which enjoys selective security under chosen ciphertext attacks, in the standard model. The price to pay is an increase in
the size of the secret keys skω , that must contain 2l additional elements, where l is the bit-length of the verification keys of
a (one-time) signature scheme that is used in the transformation. The size of the ciphertexts remains constant.
4. KP-ABE constructions with short ciphertexts for monotonic LSSS-realizable access structures
In this section, our goal is to construct monotonic KP-ABE systems with short ciphertexts for any LSSS-realizable access
structure.We do so by showing a general transformation that automatically turns any IBBE scheme fitting a certain template
into a KP-ABE in the selective security model.
In spirit, the construction is somewhat similar to the one described by Boyen [14], which transforms IBE systems in the
exponent-inversion framework (e.g., [33]) into ABE primitives. The approach of [14] takes advantage of certain linearity
properties in a family of IBE schemes. Our approach also exploits some linearity properties, albeit instead of IBE, we use
IBBE as the underlying primitive. In contrast to [14], our transformation preserves the ciphertext size, so that using IBBE
schemes with short ciphertexts yields KP-ABE constructions with the same ciphertext size.
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4.1. Linear ID-based broadcast encryption template
We define a template that IBBE schemes should comply with in order to give rise to (selectively secure) KP-ABE schemes.
We call this a linear IBBE template. Let (G,GT ) be underlying bilinear groups of order p. A linear IBBE scheme is determined
by parameters n, n1, n2 ∈ N, an efficiently samplable family F of vectors ( f1, f2, F) of functions, and a functionD , of which
the latter two are specified by
F ⊂ ( f1, f2, F) | f1 : Z∗p → G, f2 : Z∗p → Gn1 , F : (Z∗p)≤n−1 → G≤n2,
D : Gn1+2 × I× G≤n2+1 ×  I
<n
→ GT ,
with requirements specified below. We assume w.l.o.g. that identities are encoded as elements of Z∗p (otherwise, they can
always be hashed modulo p) and the linear IBBE template is as follows.
I Setup(λ, n): Given a security parameter λ ∈ N and a strict upper bound n ∈ N on the number of identities per ciphertext,
the algorithm selects bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p and a generator g
R← G. It computes e(g, g)α for a random
α
R← Z∗p and chooses functions ( f1, f2, F) R← F . The master secret key consists ofmsk := gα while the public key is
mpk := g, e(g, g)α, f1, f2, F , n, n1, n2.
I Keygen(msk, ID): It picks r
R← Z∗p and computes
SKID = (d1, d2, d3) =

gα · f1(ID)r , g r , f2(ID)r
 ∈ Gn1+2.
I Encrypt(mpk,M, S): It parses S as S = {ID1, . . . , IDq}, where q < n. To encrypt M ∈ GT , it chooses a random exponent
s
R← Z∗p and computes the ciphertext as
C = (C0, C1, C2) =

M · e(g, g)α·s, g s, F(ID1, . . . , IDq)s

.
I Decrypt(mpk,SKID, ID, C, S): It parses SKID as (d1, d2, d3) ∈ Gn1+2 and the ciphertext C as (C0, C1, C2) ∈ GT × Gn2+1.
Then, it runs
D

(d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1, C2), S
→ e(g, g)α·s,
and obtainsM = C0/e(g, g)α·s.
Moreover, for all ( f1, f2, F) ∈ F , the two following properties must hold.
(1) Correctness. For all α, r, s ∈ Z∗p , ID ∈ I, S = {ID1, . . . , IDq} ∈

I
<n

and ID ∈ S, we have
D

gα f1(ID)r , g r , f2(ID)r

, ID, (g s, F(ID1, . . . , IDq)s), S

= e(g, g)α·s.
(2) Linearity. For all γ ∈ Z∗p , ID ∈ I, S ∈

I
<n

, ID ∈ S, all keys (d1, d2, d3) ∈ Gn1+2 and all (C1, C2) ∈ G≤n2+1, we have
D

(d1, d2, d3)γ , ID, (C1, C2), S

= D

(d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1, C2), S
γ
. (4)
4.2. Generic conversion from linear IBBE to KP-ABE
LetΠIBBE = (Setup′,Keygen′, Encrypt′,Decrypt′) be a linear IBBE system. We construct a KP-ABE scheme fromΠIBBE as
follows.
I Setup(λ, n): It simply outputs Setup′(λ, n)→ (msk,mpk).
I Keygen(msk, (L, π)): The algorithm computes a private key for an access structure that is associated with LSSS scheme
(L, π) as follows. Let L be ℓ × k matrix. First, it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS (L, π). Namely, it chooses a vector
β⃗ = (β1, β2, . . . , βk)⊤ R← (Zp)k subject to the constraint β1 = 1. Then for each i = 1 to ℓ, it calculates λi = ⟨L⃗i, β⃗⟩, picks
r ′ R← Zp and sets Di as follows.
Keygen′(msk, π(i))→ (di,1, di,2, di,3),
Di = (d′i,1, d′i,2, d′i,3)
= dλii,1 · f1(π(i))r ′ , dλii,2 · g r ′ , dλii,3 · f2(π(i))r ′.
It then outputs the private key as sk(L,π) = {Di}i=1,...,ℓ.
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I Encrypt(mpk,M, ω): It simply outputs Encrypt′(mpk,M, ω)→ (C0, C1, C2).
I Decrypt(mpk, sk(L,π), (L, π), C, ω): Assume first that the policy (L, π) is satisfied by the attribute setω, so that decryption
is possible. Let I = {i| π(i) ∈ ω}. It calculates the reconstruction constants {(i, µi)}i∈I = Recon(L,π)(ω). It parses C as
(C0, C1, C2) and sk(L,π) as {Di}i=1,...,ℓ where Di = (d′i,1, d′i,2, d′i,3). For each i ∈ I , it computes
D

(d′i,1, d
′
i,2, d
′
i,3), ID, (C1, C2), S
→ e(g, g)α·s·λi , (5)
which we prove correctness below. It computes e(g, g)α·s = i∈I e(g, g)α·s·λiµi and finally obtains M = C0/e(g, g)α·s,
where we recall that

i∈I µi · λi = 1.
Correctness.We now verify that Eq. (5) is correct. First, the distribution of private keys in the linear IBBE template is such
that (di,1, di,2, di,3) will be in the form

gα · f1(π(i))ri , g ri , f2(π(i))ri

for some ri ∈R Zp. Therefore, by construction, we can
write
Di =

gαλi · f1(π(i))r˜iλi , g r˜iλi , f2(π(i))r˜iλi
 = dλi1 , dλi2 , dλi3 ,
where r˜i = ri + r ′/λi and (d1, d2, d3) = SKπ(i) denotes an IBBE private key for the identity π(i) and the random exponent
r˜i. The linearity requirement (4) then implies
D

(d′i,1, d
′
i,2, d
′
i,3), ID, (C1, C2), S
 = D(d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1, C2), Sλi
= e(g, g)α·sλi
for each i ∈ I , which guarantees correctness.
The construction only guarantees selective security for the resulting KP-ABE. It does not extend to the adaptive scenario
because the proof relies crucially on the fact that the reduction knows the forbidden attribute set from the beginning.
Theorem 14. If the underlying IBBE scheme is selectively secure, then so is the resulting KP-ABE system. More precisely, for any
selective-set adversaryA against the KP-ABE construction, there is an IND-sID-CPA adversaryB against the IBBE scheme and
AdvIBBE-sID-CPAB (λ) ≥ AdvKP-ABE-sCPAA (λ).
Proof. Wedescribe a simple IND-sID-CPA IBBE adversaryB assuming that a selective-set attackerA can break the selective
security of the KP-ABE systemwith non-negligible advantage. Namely,B plays the role ofA’s challenger and interacts with
his own challenger in the IBBE security game.
The game begins with the KP-ABE adversaryA choosing an attribute setω⋆ that he intends to attack. The IBBE adversary
B then announces his target set of receivers S⋆ = {i ∈ ω⋆}. The system-wide IBBE public key that B receives from his
challenger are relayed toA as system-wide parameters for the KP-ABE scheme.
Throughout the game, Amay ask for the private key of any access structure (L, π) such that ω⋆ does not satisfy (L, π).
To answer such a query, B proceeds as follows. Let Lω⋆ be the sub-matrix formed by the rows of L that correspond to an
attribute in ω⋆. Since 1⃗ = (1, 0, . . . , 0)⊤ is not in the row space of Lω⋆ , there must exist an efficiently computable vector
w⃗ such that Lω⋆ · w⃗ = 0⃗ and ⟨1⃗, w⃗⟩ ≠ 0 (according to proposition 1 in [24]). Let h denote the value ⟨1⃗, w⃗⟩. To construct a
private key, B has to define a vector u⃗ = α · β⃗ such that ⟨1⃗, u⃗⟩ = α, which will be used to define shares λi = ⟨L⃗i, u⃗⟩. As in
the proof of theorem 3 in [24],B implicitly sets u⃗ as u⃗ = v⃗ + ψ · w⃗, where v⃗ = (v1, . . . , vk)⊤ is a randomly chosen vector
and ψ = (α − v1)/h, so that ⟨1⃗, u⃗⟩ = α. To generate triples (Di,1,Di,2,Di,3) for each row of L,B proceeds as follows.
1. Let Γ1 = {j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} | π(j) ∈ ω⋆}. For each j ∈ Γ1, if L⃗⊤j = (mj1, . . . ,mjk) denotes the jth row of L, we have
⟨L⃗j, w⃗⟩ = 0, so that ⟨L⃗j, u⃗⟩ = ⟨L⃗j, v⃗⟩ = kt1=1 mjt1vt1 and the share λj = ⟨L⃗j, u⃗⟩ is thus computable, so that B can pick
integers λj, rj
R← Z∗p and define
Dj = (Dj,1,Dj,2,Dj,2) =

gλj · f1(π(j))rj , g rj , f2(π(j))rj

.
2. Let Γ2 = {j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} | π(j) ∉ ω⋆}. For each j ∈ Γ2, B is allowed to query its own challenger to extract
(dj,1, dj,2, dj,3)← ΠIBBE.Keygen(msk, π(j)). Also, we have
⟨L⃗j, u⃗⟩ = ⟨L⃗j, v⃗⟩ + ψ · ⟨L⃗j, w⃗⟩ =
k
t1=1
mjt1

vt1 +
(α − v1)
h
· wt1

= µ1 · α + µ2,
where the coefficients
µ1 =

k
t1=1
mjt1wt1

· h−1, µ2 = h−1 ·
k
t1=1
mjt1

hvt1 − v1wt1

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are both computable, so thatB can easily obtain a well-formed triple Dj = (Dj,1,Dj,2,Dj,3) by setting
Dj = (Dj,1,Dj,2,Dj,3) =

dµ1j,1 · gµ2 · f1(π(j))r
′
j , dµ1j,2 · g r
′
j , dµ1j,3 · f2(π(j))r
′
j

.
When A decides to enter the challenge phase, he outputs messages M0,M1 that B forwards to his challenger before
relaying the challenge ciphertexts back toA.
The second series of private key queries is handled as the first one andB eventually outputs the same result σ ′ ∈ {0, 1}
as A does. It is easy to see that B never has to query his challenger to extract the private key for an identity of the target
attribute set S⋆ = ω⋆. It comes thatB is successful wheneverA is so and the announced result follows. 
Instantiation Example. The large-universe construction of KP-ABE in [24] falls into our framework here. Its underlying
IBBE system can be seen as a particular instance of the linear IBBE template with n2 = n, f2(ID) = ∅, F(ID1, . . . , IDq) =
( f1(ID1), . . . , f1(IDq)), and the form of f1 can be immediately deduced from [24]. Since the size of an output from F is linear,
ciphertexts in the KP-ABE of [24] are also of linear size.
4.3. IBBE instantiation with short ciphertexts
This subsection presents an IBBE scheme with short ciphertexts and shows how to apply the KP-ABE conversion. This
specific IBBE can be seen as an instance of a functional encryption system with public index – which itself is implied by the
spatial encryption scheme of [12] – that was proposed in [4, Section 4.1] for the zero evaluation of inner-products. Such a
FE system is defined by a relation RZIP : Zp × Zp → {0, 1} where RZIP(X⃗, Y⃗ ) = 1 iff ⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ = 0. The technique of deriving
an IBBE scheme from the zero evaluation of inner-products can be traced to the work of Katz et al. [27]. A private key for
an identity ID is defined by setting X⃗ = (x1, . . . , xn)⊤, with xi = IDi−1. To encrypt to a set S = {ID1, . . . , IDq}, one defines
Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ as a coefficient vector from
PS[Z] =
q+1
i=1
yiZ i−1 =

IDj∈S
(Z − IDj), (6)
where, if q+ 1 < n, the coordinates yq+2, . . . , yn are all set to 0. By doing so, we note that PS[ID] = ⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ evaluates to 0 iff
ID ∈ S. We now describe the IBBE instantiated from the FE system of [4]. Its selective security is an immediate consequence
of [4], where it is proved under the DBDHE assumption.
I Setup(λ, n): It chooses bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ with g
R← G. It randomly chooses α, α0 R← Zp,
α⃗ = (α1, . . . , αn)⊤ R← Znp . It then sets H⃗ = (h1, . . . , hn)⊤ = g α⃗ . The master secret key is msk = α, and the public key is
mpk = g, e(g, g)α, h0 = gα0 , H⃗ = g α⃗.
I Keygen(msk, ID): The algorithm first defines a vector X⃗ = (x1, . . . , xn)⊤ such that xi = IDi−1 for i = 1 to n. It chooses
r
R← Zp and outputs the private key as SKID = (D1,D2, K2, . . . , Kn)where
D1 = gα · hr0, D2 = g r ,

Ki =

h
− xix1
1 · hi
r
i=2,...,n
.
I Encrypt(mpk,M, S): To encrypt M to the receiver set S (where |S| < n), the algorithm defines Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ as the
coefficient vector of PS[Z] from Eq. (6). It then picks s R← Zp and computes the ciphertext as
C = (C0, C1, C2) =

M · e(g, g)αs, g s, h0 · hy11 · · · hynn s.
I Decrypt(mpk,SKID, ID, C, S): It defines the vector Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ from the polynomial PS[Z] as usual. It then computes
e(g, g)α·s = e(C1,D1 · K
y2
2 · · · K ynn )
e(C2,D2)
, (7)
and recoversM = C0/e(g, g)α·s.
Correctness. If ⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ = 0, then decryption recoversM since
D1 ·
n
i=2
K yii = gα ·

h0 · h
− 1x1 (⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩−x1y1)
1
n
i=2
hyii
r = gα · h0 · n
i=1
hyii
r
,
so that e(C1,D1 ·ni=1 K yii ) = e(g, g)αs · e(h0 ·ni=1 hyii , g rs) equals the product e(g, g)αs · e(C2,D2).
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Applying the KP-ABE Conversion. The above IBBE can be considered as a linear IBBE system with n1 = n − 1, n2 = 1 and
the family F is defined by taking all functions of the form
f1(ID) = h0, f2(ID) =

h−ID1 h2, . . . , h
−IDn−1
1 hn

,
F(ID1, . . . , IDq) = h0
q+1
i=1
hyii ,
where h0, h1, . . . , hn ∈R G and the vector Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ is defined from the polynomial PS[Z] in Eq. (6) as usual. In
addition, the functionD performs the computation in Eq. (7), which is easily seen to have linearity, as required.
The resulting KP-ABE construction has constant-size ciphertexts since n2 = 1. This comes at the expense of longer private
keys of sizeO(t ·n), where t is the number of attributes in the access structure. It is alsoworthmentioning that we can obtain
another IBBE with short ciphertexts from the spatial encryption scheme of [12] (which is recalled in Appendix B) since it
also falls into our framework and thus produces an equally efficient KP-ABE scheme.
5. A scheme supporting non-monotonic access structures
Our final goal in this paper is to construct KP-ABE with non-monotonic structures. To this end, we will combine the
monotonic KP-ABE system implied by the generic construction of Section 4 with a new revocation mechanism which is
presented in Section 5.1.
To securely integrate both schemes, we have to craft the revocation system in such a way that both constructions share
some similar structure and rely on the same underlying hard problem. By doing so, the security proof of the resulting non-
monotonic KP-ABE scheme goes through and rests on the same assumption as its two components.
5.1. Revocation scheme with very short ciphertexts
This section describes a new ID-based revocation system which is tailored to the needs of our application. Analogously
to the case of IBBE, an IBR scheme can be instantiated from a FE system for non-zero inner-product relations. Two such
existing IBR schemes [4, Sections 5.1 and 5.2] already provide constant-size ciphertexts. When it comes to construct a non-
monotonic KP-ABE however, these schemes seem hardly compatible with the monotonic KP-ABE of Section 4.3 as they rely
on different assumptions. We thus describe a new IBR scheme for this purpose. Its structure is similar to that of revocation
schemes given in [4] but it provides a better efficiency and relies on the DBDHE assumption.
The scheme is a functional encryption system with public index where ciphertexts and private keys both correspond to
vectors (say Y⃗ and X⃗) and decryption succeeds whenever ⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ ≠ 0⃗. Such a primitive is easily seen to imply identity-based
revocation via the same identity encoding as in Section 4.3.
In its simplified version (which uses bilinear groups of composite order groups), the scheme of [4][Appendix E] assigns
to a vector X⃗ = (x1, . . . , xn) a private key of the form
(D1,D2, {Ki}ni=1) =

gα · hr0, g r , {(hxi0 · hi)r}ni=1

whereas ciphertexts for a vector Y⃗ are encrypted as
(C0, C1, C2) =

M · e(g, g)α·s, g s, (hy11 · · · hynn )s

.
Decryption proceeds by first using Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn) and private key elements {Ki}ni=1 to compute K =
n
i=1 K
yi
i = (hX⃗ ·Y⃗0 ·n
i=1 h
yi
i )
r , so that e(K , C1)/e(C2,D2) equals e(h0, g)rs·X⃗ ·Y⃗ . Then, given that e(D1, C1) = e(g, g)α·s · e(h0, g)rs, as long as
⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ ≠ 0⃗, the receiver is able to compute
e(g, g)α·s = e(D1, C1) ·

e(K , C1)/e(C2,D2)
−1/(X⃗ ·Y⃗ )
.
The co-selective security of the above scheme was proved in [4] in groups of composite order. In this section, we slightly
modify it to prove its co-selective security in prime-order groups under the q-DBDHE assumption. This makes it easier to
combine with the concrete monotonic KP-ABE suggested in Section 4.3.
I Setup(λ, n): It chooses bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ and a generator g
R← G. It randomly picks α R← Zp,
α⃗ = (α1, . . . , αn)⊤ R← Znp and sets H⃗ = (h1, . . . , hn)⊤ = g α⃗ . The master secret key ismsk = α, while the master public key
ismpk = g, e(g, g)α, H⃗ = g α⃗.
I Keygen(msk, ID): The algorithm first defines a vector X⃗ = (x1, . . . , xn)⊤ such that xi = IDi−1 for i = 1 to n. It chooses
r
R← Zp and outputs the private key as SKID = (D1,D2, K2, . . . , Kn)where
D1 = gα · hr1, D2 = g r ,

Ki =

h
− xix1
1 · hi
r
i=2,...,n
.
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Indeed, we can also write KX⃗ = (K2, . . . , Kn) = g r·M
⊤
X⃗
α⃗ , where the matrix MX⃗ ∈ (Zp)n×(n−1) is defined by MX⃗ = − x2x1 − x3x1 ··· − xnx1
In−1

.
I Encrypt(mpk,M, S): To encryptMwith the revoked set S (where |S| < n), the algorithm defines Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ as the
coefficient vector of PS[Z] from Eq. (6). It then picks s R← Zp and computes the ciphertext as
C = (C0, C1, C2) =

M · e(g, g)α·s, g s, hy11 · · · hynn s.
I Decrypt(mpk, skID, ID, C, S): It defines X⃗ from ID and Y⃗ from S as usual. It then successively computes elements K =n
i=2 K
yi
i =

h−⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩/x11 · hy11 · · · hynn
r ,
χ =

e

K , C1)
e(C2,D2)
− x1⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩
= e(g, h1)rs,
and then obtainsM = C0 · e(C1,D1)−1 · χ.
Correctness.We first observe that
K =

h−(⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩−x1y1)/x11
n
i=2
hyii
r
=

h−⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩/x11
n
i=1
hyii
r
so that whenever ⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ ≠ 0 (i.e., ID ∉ S), the following computation can be done.
χ =

e(K , C1)
e(C2,D2)
− x1⟨ X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩ =  e(h−⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩/x11 ni=1 hyii , g rs)
e(
n
i=1 h
yi
i , g rs)
− x1⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩
= e(g, h1)rs.
Finally, we have e(C1,D1) · χ−1 = e(g, g)α·s · e(g s, hr1) · e(g, h1)−rs = e(g, g)α·s.We note that the decryption algorithm can
be optimized by computing the plaintext as
M = C0 · e

C2,D
x1/⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩
2
 · eC1,D−11 · K−x1/⟨X⃗,Y⃗ ⟩.
As already mentioned, this IBR scheme shares the same high-level structure (including the form of the public key and
the ciphertext) as the IBBE in Section 4.3 and relies on the same assumption. These similarities make it possible to assemble
both constructions in the design of a non-monotonic ABE system in Section 5.2.
We now prove the co-selective security of the scheme. It is also worth recalling that co-selective security for IBR also
implies selective security.
Theorem 15. The above ID-based revocation scheme with the maximal bound n for the number of revoked users (i.e., |S| < n)
is co-selectively secure if the n-DBDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ). Namely, any co-selective adversary A implies a n-DBDHE
distinguisherB such that
Advn-DBDHEB (λ) ≥ AdvIBR-co-sCPAA (λ).
Proof. We show a distinguisherB that receives a tuple
(g, h, z1, . . . , zn, zn+2, . . . , z2n, T ) ∈ G2n+1 × GT ,
where zi = g(γ i), and decides if T = e(g, h)(γ n+1) using the co-selective adversaryA.
At the outset of the game, the adversary A declares the set S˜ = {ID1, . . . , IDq}, where q ≤ n − 1, of identities for
which he wishes to obtain private keys. Let X⃗1, . . . , X⃗q the corresponding vectors. That is, X⃗k = (1, IDk, ID2k, . . . , IDn−1k ). To
prepare the master public key, algorithmB chooses δ0
R← Zp and computes e(g, g)α = e(z1, zn)δ0 , which implicitly defines
α = γ (n+1) · δ0. Elements H⃗ = (h1, . . . , hn)⊤ are then defined as follows. For each k ∈ [1, q], B considers the vector
X⃗k = (xk,1, . . . , xk,n)⊤ and selects b⃗k ∈ Znp such that
b⃗ ⊤k ·MX⃗k = b⃗ ⊤k ·
 − xk,2xk,1 − xk,3xk,1 · · · − xk,nxk,1
In−1

= 0⃗. (8)
The simplest candidate consists of the vector b⃗k = (1, xk,2xk,1 ,
xk,3
xk,1
, . . . ,
xk,n
xk,1
)⊤. Then, B considers the n × n matrix B =
b⃗1| . . . |b⃗q|0⃗| . . . |0⃗

whose kth column consists of b⃗k, for k = 1 to q, and where the n − q remaining columns are 0⃗. It
defines a⃗ = (a1, . . . , an)⊤ ∈ (Zp)n such that ai = γ n+1−i by setting g a⃗ = (zn, . . . , z1)⊤. Then, it implicitly sets α⃗ = B · a⃗+ δ⃗
by randomly choosing δ⃗
R← Znp and defining H⃗ = gB·a⃗ · g δ⃗ , which is uniformly distributed as required.
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Due to (8), the matrix B is defined in such a way that, for each k ∈ [1, q], the kth column of M⊤
X⃗k
· B ∈ (Zp)(n−1)×n is 0⃗,
so that M⊤
X⃗k
· B · a⃗ does not contain ak = γ n+1−k. Then, a private key for the identity IDk (and thus the vector X⃗k) can be
obtained by implicitly defining r˜k = rk− δ0γ k for a random rk R← Zp. Indeed, with the above choice of B, the first coordinate
of α⃗ = δ⃗ +qj=1 ajb⃗j equals α1 = δ1 +qj=1 aj = δ1 +qj=1 γ (n+1−j), so thatB is able to compute
D1 = gα · hr˜k1 = g(γ
n+1)δ0 · hrk1 ·

gδ1 ·
q
j=1
zn+1−j
−δ0γk
= hrk1 ·

zδ1k ·
q
j=1,j≠k
zn+1−j+k
−δ0
and D2 = g rk · z−δ0k . As for the delegation component KX⃗k = g
r˜kM⊤X⃗k
α⃗
,B is also able to compute it from available values since
M⊤
X⃗k
α⃗ = M⊤
X⃗k
· B · a⃗ + M⊤
X⃗k
· δ⃗ is independent of ak = γ n+1−k (recall that the kth column of M⊤X⃗k · B is 0⃗) and no term γ
n+1
appears in the exponent in KX⃗k .
In the challenge phase,B choosesM0,M1 ∈ GT and a revocation set S corresponding to a vector Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ that
must satisfy ⟨X⃗k, Y⃗ ⟩ = 0 for k = 1 to q. This amounts to say that Y⃗ = MX⃗k · w⃗, where w⃗ = (y2, . . . , yn)⊤ and for each
k ∈ [1, q], as we have the equivalence
⟨X⃗k, Y⃗ ⟩ = 0 ⇔ y1 = y2 ·

−xk,2
xk,1

+ · · · + yn ·

−xk,n
xk,1

⇔ Y⃗ = MX⃗k · (y2, . . . , yn)⊤.
Now, we claim that Y⃗⊤ · B · a⃗ = 0. Indeed,
Y⃗⊤ · B · a⃗ = Y⃗⊤ ·

q
k=1
ak · b⃗k

=
q
k=1
ak · Y⃗⊤ · b⃗k =
q
k=1
ak · w⃗⊤ ·M⊤X⃗k · b⃗k
andM⊤
X⃗k
· b⃗k = 0⃗ for each k ∈ [1, q]. Therefore, it comes that ⟨Y⃗ , α⃗⟩ = ⟨Y⃗ , δ⃗⟩, so thatB can generate a challenge ciphertext
(C0, C1, C2) as
C0 = Mσ · T δ0 , C1 = h, C2 = h⟨Y⃗ ,δ⃗⟩,
for a random bit σ
R← {0, 1}. If T = e(g, h)(γ n+1), C = (C0, C1, C2) forms a valid encryption ofMd. If T is random, C carries
no information on σ ∈ {0, 1} andA’s advantage is clearly zero. 
In the proof of the above theorem, we note that terms z1 and z2n are not used in the reduction. However, they will be
used in the security proof of our non-monotonic KP-ABE (where the reduction will set up part of the public parameters in a
similar way to the proof of Theorem 15) in Section 5.2 and we thus used the n-DBDHE assumption for clarity.
Efficiency Comparisons.We believe this IBR scheme to be of interest in its own right. If we compare it with the scheme of
[4, Section 5.2] (called AL2 here), which also features short ciphertexts, it relies on a stronger assumption (since no ‘‘q-type’’
assumption is needed in [4] or in LSW2 [28]) but provides significantly shorter ciphertexts (as the ciphertext overhead is
decreased by more than 75%)3 and requires fewer pairing evaluations to decrypt (only 2 instead of 9). Another IBR scheme
(dubbed AL1 in the table) with a better efficiency than AL2 was described in [4, Section 5.1]. Still, the new scheme is slightly
more efficient and relies on the q-DBDHE assumptionwhich is somewhatmore natural than the stronger q-type assumption
(MEBDH) used in [28,4].
In comparison with the schemes of Lewko, Sahai andWaters [28], the disadvantage lies in that a bound on the number of
revocations must be chosen when the system is set up. A comparative efficiency of known IBR schemes is given in Table 1.
In the table, we denote n¯ = # of revoked users = |S|; n = the maximal bound for n¯ (i.e., |S| < n). We denote as pair., exp.
the number of pairing and exponentiation computation, respectively.
5.2. A non-monotonic KP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts
Ostrovsky, Sahai and Waters [32] suggested a technique to move from monotonic to non-monotonic access structures
without incurring an immoderate private key size. They assume a family {ΠA}A∈AS of linear secret-sharing schemes for a set
3 We compare by simple element counting. In a stricter sense, one may want to also consider the compensation due to the attack on q-type assumptions
by Cheon [19].
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Table 1
Performances of revocation systems.
Schemes Ciphertext overhead Private key size Decryption cost Assumption
|G| |G| pair. exp.
LSW1 [28] (2n¯+ 1) 3 3 O(n¯) n-MEBDH
LSW2 [28] (2n¯+ 7) 7 9 O(n¯) DLIN, DBDH
AL1 [4] 3 (n+ 2) 3 O(n) n-MEBDH
AL2 [4] 9 (n+ 2) 9 O(n) DLIN, DBDH
This work 2 (n+ 2) 2 O(n) n-DBDHE
of monotone access structures A. For each such access structure A ∈ AS, the set P of underlying parties is defined in such
a way that parties’ names can be normal (like x) or primed (like x′). Prime attributes are conceptually seen as the negation
of unprimed attributes. In addition, it is required that, if x ∈ P , then x′ ∈ P and vice versa.
A familyAS of non-monotone access structures can be defined as follows. For each access structure A ∈ AS over a set
of parties P , one defines a possibly non-monotonic access structure NM(A) over the set P˜ of all unprimed parties in P .
An operator N(.) is then defined as follows. For every set S˜ ⊂ P˜ , one imposes S˜ ⊂ N(S˜). Also, for each x ∈ P˜ such that
x ∉ S˜, x′ ∈ N(S˜). Finally, NM(A) is defined by saying that S˜ is authorized in NM(A) if and only if N(S˜) is authorized in A (so
that NM(A) has only unprimed parties in its access sets). For each access set X ∈ NM(A), there is a set in A containing the
elements in X and primed elements for each party not in X .
In [32], the above technique was combined with the Naor–Pinkas revocation method [31] to cope with non-monotonic
access structures. Lewko, Sahai andWaters provided improvements using a revocation system with short keys [28] instead
of [31]. In the following, we apply the same technique to our revocation mechanism and combine it with the monotonic
KP-ABE derived from the IBBE scheme of Section 4.3 in order to handle non-negated attributes.
I Setup(λ, n): Given a security parameter λ ∈ N and a bound n ∈ N of the number of attributes per ciphertext, it chooses
bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ and g
R← G. It defines H⃗ = (h1, . . . , hn)⊤ and U⃗ = (u0, . . . , un)⊤
such that hi = gαi , uj = gβj for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {0, . . . , n} where α⃗ = (α1, . . . , αn)⊤ R← Znp and
β⃗ = (β0, β1, . . . , βn)⊤ R← Zn+1p . It then picks α R← Z∗p and computes e(g, g)α . The master secret key is msk = α and
the master public key is
mpk = g, e(g, g)α, H⃗ = g α⃗, U⃗ = g β⃗.
I Keygen(msk, A˜): Given a non-monotonic access structure A˜ such that we have A˜ = NM(A) for some monotonic access
structureA over a setP of attributes and associatedwith a linear secret sharing schemeΠ , the algorithmappliesΠ to obtain
shares {λi} of the master secret key α. The party corresponding to share λi is denoted by x˘i ∈ P , where xi is the underlying
attribute, and can be primed (i.e., negated) or unprimed (non-negated). For each i, the algorithm chooses ri
R← Zp, defines
ρ⃗i = (ρi,1, . . . , ρi,n)⊤ = (1, xi, x2i , . . . , xn−1i )⊤. That is ρi,j = xj−1i . Then, it does as follows.
• For each i such that x˘i is an unprimed (i.e., non-negated) attribute, the key generation algorithm computes a tuple
Di = (D(1)i,1 ,D(1)i,2 , K (1)ρ⃗i,i) ∈ Gn+1 where the first two elements are of the form (D
(1)
i,1 ,D
(1)
i,2 ) =

gλi ·uri0 , g ri

and the third one
is a tuple
K (1)
ρ⃗i,i
= (K (1)i,2 , . . . , K (1)i,n ) =

u
− ρi,2ρi,1
1 · u2
ri , . . . , u− ρi,nρi,11 · unri
whereMρ⃗i ∈ (Zp)n×(n−1) is the matrixMρ⃗i =

− ρi,2ρi,1 −
ρi,3
ρi,1
··· − ρi,nρi,1
In−1

.
• For each i such that x˘i is primed (i.e., negated), the algorithm computesDi = (D(2)i,1 ,D(2)i,2 , K (2)ρ⃗i,i) ∈ Gn+1 where (D
(2)
i,1 ,D
(2)
i,2 ) =
gλi · hri1 , g ri

and
K (2)
ρ⃗i,i
= (K (2)i,2 , . . . , K (2)i,n ) =

h
− ρi,2ρi,1
1 · h2
ri , . . . , h− ρi,nρi,11 · hnri = g ri·M⊤ρ⃗i α⃗.
The private key is skA˜ = {Di}x˘i∈P ∈ Gℓ×(n+1).
I Encrypt(mpk,M, ω): To encryptM ∈ GT for a set ω (with |ω| < n), the algorithm first defines Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ as the
vector whose first q+1 coordinates are the coefficients of the polynomial Pω[Z] =q+1i=1 yiZ i−1 =j∈ω(Z− j). If q+1 < n,
set yj = 0 for q+ 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, it randomly picks s R← Zp and computes
C = (C0, C1, C2, C3) =

M · e(g, g)α·s, g s,

u0 ·
n
i=1
uyii
s
,

n
i=1
hyii
s
.
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I Decrypt(mpk, skA˜, A˜, C, ω): It parses C as (C0, C1, C2, C3) ∈ GT×G3 and the private key skA˜ as skA˜ = {Di}x˘i∈P ∈ Gℓ×(n+1).
The algorithm outputs⊥ if ω ∉ A˜. Otherwise, since A˜ = NM(A) for some access structure A associated with a linear secret
sharing scheme Π , we have ω′ = N(ω) ∈ A and we let I = {i : x˘i ∈ ω′}. Since ω′ is authorized in A, the receiver can
efficiently compute coefficients {µi}i∈I such thati∈I µiλi = α (although the shares are not known to the receiver). Let
Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ be the vector containing the coefficients of Pω[Z] =j∈ω(Z − j) =q+1i=1 yiZ i−1.
• For every positive attribute x˘i ∈ ω′ (for which xi ∈ ω), the decryption procedure computes D˜(1)i,1 = D(1)i,1 ·
n
j=2 K
(1)
i,j
yj =
gλi · u0 · uy11 · · · uynn ri , and then e(g, g)λis = e(C1, D˜(1)i,1 )/e(C2,D(1)i,2 ).
• For each negated attribute x˘i ∈ ω′ (for which xi ∉ ω), the receiver sets ρ⃗i = (1, xi, . . . , xn−1i )⊤ and successively computes
K (2)i =
n
j=2
K (2)i,j
yj = h−⟨ρ⃗i,Y⃗ ⟩/ρi,11 · hy11 · · · hynn ri ,
χi =

e

K (2)i , C1)
e(C3,D
(2)
i,2 )
− ρi,1⟨ρ⃗i,Y⃗ ⟩ = e(g, h1)ris
and then e(g, g)λis = e(C1,D(2)i,1 )−1 · χ−1i .
Finally, decryption computesM = C0 ·i∈I e(g, g)−µiλis.
If we split I into I0∪ I1, where I0 and I1 correspond to unprimed and primed attributes, respectively, decryption canmore
efficiently compute
e(g, g)α·s = e

C1,

i∈I0
D˜(1)
µi
i,1 ·

i∈I1

D(2)i,1 · K (2)i
µi ·ρi,1
⟨ρ⃗i,Y⃗ ⟩

·e

C2,

i∈I0
D(1)
µi
i,2

· e

C3,

i∈I1
D(2)i,2
µi ·ρi,1
⟨ρ⃗i,Y⃗ ⟩

,
so that only three pairing evaluations are necessary.
Theorem 16. The above KP-ABE system with the maximal bound n for the number of attributes per ciphertext (i.e., |ω| < n) is
selectively secure if the n-DBDHE assumption holds. Concretely, any selective-set adversary A implies a n-DBDHE distinguisher
B with advantage
Advn-DBDHEB (λ) ≥ AdvKP-ABE-sCPAA (λ).
Proof. We outline an algorithm B that receives (g, h, z1, . . . , zn, zn+2, . . . , z2n, T ) ∈ G2n+1 × GT , where zi = g(γ i), and
decides if T = e(g, h)(γ n+1) using the selective-set adversaryA. We define γ⃗ = (γ , γ 2, . . . , γ n)⊤ for further use.
At the very beginning of the attack game, the adversary A announces the attribute set ω⋆ that he wishes to be chal-
lenged upon. This target set ω⋆ is used to define a vector Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤ containing the coefficients of the polyno-
mial Pω⋆ [Z] = j∈ω⋆(Z − j) = ni=1 yiZ i−1 (in the event that |ω⋆| = q is strictly smaller than n − 1, algorithm B sets
yq+1 = · · · = yn = 0).
Simulation of the setup phase. To generate the master public key,B will consider three parts: the first part relates to non-
negated attributes, which are elements U⃗ = g β⃗ ; the second part relates to negated attributes, which are elements H⃗ = g α⃗;
the last part is the common element e(g, g)α .
• For the common part, it picks δ0 R← Zp and lets e(g, g)α = e(z1, zn)δ0 . This implicitly defines the master secret as
α = γ (n+1) · δ0.
• For the public key part related to non-negated attributes, it simulates similarly as in the proof of the underlying IBBE
of Section 4.3 (which we omitted the proof there). More concretely, it picks θ0
R← Zp and computes u0 = gθ0 · g−⟨γ⃗ ,Y⃗ ⟩
from g γ⃗ . Other components of U⃗ are defined by setting U⃗ ′ := (u1, . . . , un)⊤ = g γ⃗ · g θ⃗ , for some randomly chosen vector
θ⃗
R← Znp , so that we have β⃗ ′ := (β1, . . . , βn)⊤ = γ⃗ + θ⃗ .• For the public key part related to negated attributes, it simulates similarly as in the proof of the underlying IBR of
Section 5.1 (which is recorded in the proof of Theorem15). Intuitively, it proceeds as if the announced set S˜ in Theorem15
(for private key queries there) is set to S˜ = ω⋆. More concretely, we first write ω⋆ = {ω1, . . . , ωq} in some order,
then we define their corresponding vectors X⃗1, . . . , X⃗q as X⃗k = (1, ωk, . . . , ωn−1k )⊤. It then defines the n × n matrix
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B = b⃗1| . . . |b⃗q|0⃗| . . . |0⃗ from the definition of b⃗k as in Eq. (8), where it can be re-written this time as:
b⃗ ⊤k ·MX⃗k = b⃗ ⊤k ·
 −ωk − ω2k · · · − ωn−1k
In−1

= 0⃗.
It then proceeds to define H⃗ as H⃗ = gB·a⃗ · g δ⃗ , for known random δ⃗ R← Znp . We also recall that a⃗ = (γ n, γ n−1, . . . , γ )⊤.
Simulation of key extraction queries. At any time, the adversaryAmay query a private key for arbitrary access structures
A˜ such that RKP(A˜, ω⋆) = 0. By assumption, A˜ = NM(A) for some monotonic access structure A, defined over a set P of
parties, associated with a linear secret sharing scheme Π . Let L ∈ Zℓ×np denote the share-generating matrix for Π . Since
RKP(A˜, ω⋆) = 0, we have that RKP(A, ω′) = 0, where ω′ = N(ω⋆). Therefore, 1⃗ = (1, 0, . . . , 0)⊤ does not lie in the row
space of Lω′ , which is the sub-matrix of L formed by rows corresponding to attributes in ω′. Hence, similarly to the proof of
Theorem 14, due to the proposition 11 in [28], we have that there must exist an efficiently computable vector w⃗ ∈ Znp such
that ⟨1⃗, w⃗⟩ = 1 and Lω′ · w⃗ = 0⃗. NowB will implicitly define each share of α as λi = ⟨L⃗i, v⃗⟩, corresponding to a party named
x˘i ∈ P where xi is the underlying attribute (x˘i being primed or unprimed). It does by implicitly defining v⃗ = ζ⃗ + (α− ζ1)w⃗
where ζ⃗ = (ζ1, . . . , ζn)⊤ R← Znp . Note that we have that v1 = α and that v2, . . . , vn ∈ Zp are uniformly distributed, as
required in Definition 4. AlthoughB cannot compute ⟨L⃗i, v⃗⟩ for all i, it can compute a private key as follows.
• For negated parties x˘i = x′i ,B distinguishes two cases.
– If xi ∈ ω⋆ (and thus x˘i ∉ ω′), λi = ⟨L⃗i, v⃗⟩ depends on α and can be written as λi = ν1α + ν2 for constants ν1, ν2 ∈ Zp
that are known to B. Since in this case xi ∈ ω⋆ = {ω1, . . . , ωq}, hence xi = ωk for some k ∈ [1, q]. Now recall that
the underlying IBR scheme allows us to simulate the IBR key for identity ω1, . . . , ωq. Hence, the one for ωk can also be
constructed and is of the form
(D1,D2, K2, . . . , Kn) =

gα · hr1, g r ,

h
− ρi,2ρi,1
1 · h2
r
, . . . ,

h
− ρi,nρi,1
1 · hn
r
,
where ρ⃗i = (ρi,1, . . . , ρi,n)⊤ = X⃗k = (1, ωk, . . . , ωn−1k ) = (1, xi, . . . , xn−1i ), for some (unknown) randomness r ∈ Zp.
From there,B can obtain a valid piece of key material
(D(2)i,1 ,D
(2)
i,2 , K
(2)
i,2 , . . . , K
(2)
i,n )
by drawing r ′ R← Zp and setting D(2)i,1 = Dν11 · gν2 · hr ′1 , D(2)i,2 = Dν12 · g r ′ and K (2)i,j = K ν1j · (h−ρi,j/ρi,11 · hj)r ′ for each
j ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
– If xi ∉ ω⋆ (so that x˘i ∈ ω′), ⟨L⃗i, w⃗⟩ = 0⃗ so that L⃗i · v⃗ = L⃗i · ζ⃗ is entirely known toB that can easily compute a suitably
distributed tuple
Di = (D(2)i,1 ,D(2)i,2 , K (2)i,2 , . . . , K (2)i,n ),
where D(2)i,1 = g L⃗i·v⃗ · hri1 for a random ri R← Zp.• For non-negated parties x˘i = xi,B proceeds as follows.
– If xi ∈ ω⋆, λi = ⟨L⃗i, v⃗⟩ does not depend on α and is entirely known toB. Therefore,B can compute the key material
Di = (D(1)i,1 ,D(1)i,2 , K (1)i,2 , . . . , K (1)i,n )
by setting D(1)i,1 = gλi · uri0 for random ri R← Zp.
– If xi ∉ ω⋆, λi = ⟨L⃗i, v⃗⟩ is of the form λi = ν1α + ν2 for known constants ν1, ν2 ∈ Zp and B has to proceed as in
[12][Theorem 1]. Namely, it considers the n× (n− 1)matrix
Mρ⃗i =
 − ρi,2
ρi,1
− ρi,3
ρi,1
· · · − ρi,n
ρi,1
In−1

=
 −xi − x2i · · · − xn−1i
In−1

where ρi,j = xj−1i for j = 1 to n. Since xi ∉ ω⋆, the vector
ξ⃗ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn)⊤ = (1, xi, x2i , . . . , xn−1i )⊤
is such that ξ⃗⊤Mρ⃗i = 0⃗ but ⟨−Y⃗ , ξ⃗⟩ ≠ 0. Using this fact, the simulatorB can first generate a tuple of the form
(D1,D2, K2, . . . , Kn) =

gα · ur˜0, g r˜ , g r˜M
⊤
ρ⃗i
β⃗ ′
,
with β⃗ ′ = (β1, . . . , βn)⊤ and where r˜ is defined as
r˜ = r + δ0(ξ1γ n + ξ2γ n−1 + · · · + ξnγ )/⟨Y⃗ , ξ⃗⟩.
To see whyB is able to compute this, we note that, for any vector f⃗ ∈ Znp the coefficient of γ n+1 in the product r˜⟨ f⃗ , γ⃗ ⟩
is δ0⟨ f⃗ , ξ⃗⟩/⟨Y⃗ , ξ⃗⟩. Given that M ⊤ρ⃗i ξ⃗ = 0⃗, when f⃗ ⊤ is successively set as each row of M⊤ρ⃗i , the above argument shows
that the unknown element zn+1 = g(γ n+1) is canceled out in g r˜M
⊤
ρ⃗i
β⃗ ′
, which is thus computable from available elements.
In addition, by applying the same argument to f⃗ = Y⃗ , we see that
gα · ur˜0 = zδ0n+1 ·

gθ0 · g−⟨γ⃗ ,Y⃗ ⟩r˜
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Table 2
Efficiency of non-monotonic KP-ABE schemes.
Schemes Ciphertext overhead Private key size Decryption cost Assumption
|G| |G| pair. exp.
OSW [32] O(n¯) O(t · log n) O(t) O(t · n¯) DBDH
LSW [28] O(n¯) O(t) O(t) O(t · n¯) n-MEBDH
OT [36] O(n¯ · ϕ) O(t · ϕ) O(t · ϕ) O(t) DLIN
OTmodified O(n¯ · n) O(t · n) O(t · n) O(t) DLIN
This work 3 O(t · n) 3 O(t) n-DBDHE
is also computable since the coefficient of γ n+1 is −δ0 in the product −r˜⟨γ⃗ , Y⃗ ⟩. Once algorithm B has obtained
(D1,D2, K2, . . . , Kn), it easily obtains a suitably distributed tuple (D
(1)
i,1 ,D
(1)
i,2 , K
(1)
i,2 , . . . , K
(1)
i,n ) in the same way as for
negated parties.
Challenge. To generate the challenge ciphertext,B proceeds almost exactly as in the proof of Theorem 15. Due to the choice
of U⃗ and H⃗ in the setup phase, we have u0 · g ⟨β⃗ ′,Y⃗ ⟩ = gθ0+⟨θ⃗ ,Y⃗ ⟩ and g ⟨α⃗,Y⃗ ⟩ = g ⟨δ⃗,Y⃗ ⟩, so that the simulatorB can flip a random
coin σ
R← {0, 1} and calculate
C0 = Mσ · T δ0 , C1 = h, C2 = hθ0+⟨θ⃗ ,Y⃗ ⟩, C3 = h⟨δ⃗,Y⃗ ⟩.
If T = e(g, h)(γ n+1), the ciphertext (C0, C1, C2, C3) is easily seen to form a valid encryption ofMσ whereas it perfectly hides
the bit σ ∈ {0, 1} if T ∈R GT . 
5.3. Comparisons
Table 2 compares efficiency among available expressive KP-ABE schemes that support non-monotonic access structures.
Comparisons are made in terms of ciphertext overhead, private key size as well as in the number of pairing evaluations
(pair.) and exponentiations (exp., in G and GT ) upon decryption. In the table, we have n¯ = |attribute set| = |ω| for the
ciphertext overhead; we have n =the maximal bound for n¯ (i.e., |ω| < n) and t = # of attributes in an access structure, for
the private key sizes. Finally, ϕ =maximum size for repetition of attribute label per key (only for the KP-ABE with labeling,
formalized in Appendix A).
We remark that the functionality of KP-ABE in [36] is slightly different from the original one [24]. Basically, in the
traditional definition of KP-ABE, an attribute can be represented in arbitrary formats; while on the other hand, in the
definition from [36], an attribute is required to be represented in the name-value (or label-value) pair format. For self-
containment, we re-formalize the latter in Appendix A, where we also briefly propose a modification of KP-ABE [36] so as
to have the same functionality as the original ABE. We also include this modified scheme in Table 2. Note that [36] has a
unique feature of being adaptively secure.
Regarding the size of public keys, only the scheme of [36] has the size (n2). In contrast, all the other schemes have the
same linear dependency on n which disappears in the random oracle model (where these O(n) public group elements can
be derived by applying a random oracle to some short pre-determined strings).
6. Concluding remarks
This paper presented the first results for expressive ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts. In the future, several
open questions deserve further investigations.
Shorter keys. First, it will be interesting to see if shorter private keys can be obtained in non-monotonic schemes without
affecting their expressivity or the size of ciphertexts. A sufficient condition would be to obtain identity-based broadcast
encryption and revocation schemes that satisfy our template and simultaneously provide short ciphertexts and sub-linear-
size private keys.
Full Security.Another problem is to attain full securitywith compact ciphertexts. At first glance, the techniques of [29]may
seem to apply to themonotonic KP-ABE implied by Section 4 since the latter bears some similarities with the large-universe
schemes of [34,24]: at a high level, all these schemes can be seen as relatives of the first selectively secure Boneh–Boyen
IBE [7].
Unfortunately, we were not able to adapt the proof techniques of Lewko et al. [29] in our setting. These techniques
make use of a sequence of games and a crucial step of the proof consists of a game transition where so-called semi-
functional components are introduced in private keys. This transition is justified by an indistinguishability assumption and
an information-theoretic argument according to which, as long as the adversary does not make illegal private key queries,
he will not be able to notice a correlation between the semi-functional components of ciphertexts and private keys. If we
try to apply the same ideas to the scheme described in Section 4 (when the latter is instantiated in composite order groups
as in [29]), the proof fails in the crucial step because of our longer private keys which prevent us from hiding the correlation
between semi-functional ciphertext/key components in the information-theoretic sense.
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Simpler Assumptions and More Expressive Ciphertext-Policy ABE. Another worthy goal is the realization of ABE with
short ciphertexts under simple assumptions (i.e., assumptions of constant-size such as the Decision Linear assumption [9]
or the Decision Bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption [10]) instead of ‘‘q-type’’ assumptions that were used in this paper.
In the ciphertext-policy setting, yet another challengingproblem is to achieve the same level of expressivity and efficiency
(or prove it is impossible) as in the key-policy case. Our intuition is that it will be difficult to domuch better than the scheme
of Section 3 in these regards. Handling complex Boolean formulas would require to encode themwithin a constant number
of group elements and we are not aware of a method to do this.
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Appendix A. Variant: KP-ABE with labeling
We re-formalize the KP-ABE definition of [36] in our context as follows. Intuitively, the difference from normal KP-ABE
is that an attribute is required to be labeled with a number j ∈ [1, n] and that each attribute in the set associated to a
ciphertext is required to be labeled uniquely, namely 1 to n. The scheme of [36] further restricts the maximum repetition
allowed for labels in one policy, which we denote by ϕ in Table 2.
Definition 17 (KP-ABE with Labeling). Let U be an attribute space and let a positive integer n ∈ N. Define U ′ = {(j, u) | j ∈
[1, n], u ∈ U}. Define the ciphertext index domain as
ΣKP
′
e = {{(1, u1), . . . , (n, un)} | u1, . . . , un ∈ U}.
A KP-ABE with labeling for a collectionAS′ of access structures over U ′ is a functional encryption for RKP′ : AS′ ×ΣKP′e →
{0, 1} defined by RKP′(A, ω) = 1 iff ω ∈ A (for ω ∈ ΣKP′e ,A ∈ AS′).
We observe that KP-ABE with large universe U = {0, 1}∗, e.g., [24,32] and ours, implies KP-ABE with labeling. This is
since U ′ ⊂ U ,ΣKP′e ⊂ ΣKPe ,ΣKP′k ⊂ ΣKPk , and RKP′ ⇔ RKP holds and the implication comes from the embedding lemma [12,
4]. To the best of our knowledge, the converse is yet known to hold.
We now briefly propose a KP-ABE that conforms with the normal definition by modifying [36]. We construct it by
instantiating the general KP-FE scheme of [36] with d = 1, and with the inner product relation being instantiated to IBBE,
similarly as we did in Section 4.3, and setting the bound ϕ = n.
Appendix B. The Boneh–Hamburg spatial encryption and IBBE schemes
We recall the concept of spatial encryption [12]. For a matrix M ∈ Zn×dp and a vector c⃗ ∈ Znp , one considers the affine
space Aff(M, c⃗) = {Mw⃗+ c⃗ | w⃗ ∈ Zdp}. LetVn ⊆ 2(Z
n
p) be the collection of all affine spaces inside Znp . That is,Vn is defined as
Vn = {Aff(M, c⃗) |M ∈ Mn×d, c ∈ Znp, d ≤ n},
whereMn×d is the set of all n× dmatrices in Zp.
In a spatial encryption scheme, private keys correspond to affine subspaces and ciphertexts are associated with a vector
and can be decrypted by any private key associated with a subspace containing that vector. In addition, a private key
corresponding to an affine subspace V1 allows deriving (using algorithm Delegate below) a private key for any subspace
V2 such that V2 ⊂ V1.
In [12], Boneh and Hamburg gave a construction of spatial encryption with short ciphertexts. It is inspired by the Boneh–
Boyen–Goh hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme [8].
I Setup(λ, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and a maximal dimension n ∈ N for affine subspaces, choose prime-
order bilinear groups (G,GT ) and g
R← G. Choose α, α0 R← Zp and a vector α⃗ = (α1, . . . , αn)⊤ R← Znp to compute
h0 = gα0 , H⃗ = g α⃗ and e(g, g)α . The master public key is mpk = (g, e(g, g)α, h0, H⃗ = g α⃗) while the master secret
key ismsk = (α⃗, α0, α).
I Keygen(msk, V ): to generate a key for an affine space V = Aff(M, x⃗), choose r R← Z∗p and compute
KV = (K1, K2, K3) =

gα · hr0 · g r⟨x⃗,α⃗⟩, g r , g rM
⊤α⃗
I Delegate(msk, V1, KV1 , V2): takes as input two subspaces V1 = Aff(M1, x⃗1), V2 = Aff(M2, x⃗2). It outputs ⊥ if V2 ⊄ V1.
Otherwise, we must have M2 = M1T and x⃗2 = x⃗1 + M1y⃗ for some efficiently computable matrix T and vector y⃗. Given
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KV1 = (K1, K2, K3), these allow computing
KV2 =

K1 · K y⊤3 · hr10 · g r1⟨x⃗2,α⃗⟩, K2 · g r1 , K T
⊤
3 · g r1M
⊤
2 α⃗

= gα · hr ′0 · g r ′⟨x⃗2,α⃗⟩, g r ′ , g r ′M⊤2 α⃗,
where r ′ = r + r1, for some randomly drawn r1 R← Zp.
I Encrypt(mpk, x⃗,M): to encryptM ∈ GT for the vector x⃗ ∈ Znp , choose s R← Zp and compute
C = (C0, C1, C2) =

m · e(g, g)αs, g s, hs0 · g s⟨x⃗,α⃗⟩

I Decrypt(mpk, V , KV , x⃗, C): parse C as (C0, C1, C2) and KV as (K1, K2, K3). Compute the plaintext as M = C0 ·
e(C2, K2)/e(C1, K1).
The Boneh–Hamburg IBBE is a particular case of the spatial encryption primitive and its specification is as follows.
I Setup(λ, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer n ∈ N such that n− 1 is the maximal number of receivers
per ciphertext, choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) and g
R← G. Choose h0 R← G as well a vector h⃗ = (h1, . . . , hn)⊤ R← Gn such
that hi = gai for i = 1, . . . , nwith a⃗ = (a1, . . . , an)⊤ R← Znp . Finally, pick α R← Z∗p and compute e(g, g)α . The master public
key ismpk = g, e(g, g)α, h0, h⃗ = g a⃗.while the master secret key ismsk = (a⃗, α).
I Keygen(msk, ID): to generate a private key for an identity ID, choose r
R← Z∗p and compute a tuple
KID = (K1, K2, T1, . . . , Tn−1) =

gα · hr0, g r , hr2 · h−ID·r1 , . . . , hrn · h−ID·rn−1

for which (T1, . . . , Tn−1)⊤ can be written g r·M
⊤
ID ·a⃗, for some matrixMID ∈ Zn×(n−1)p (defined below).
I Encrypt(mpk, S,M): to encryptM ∈ GT for the receiver set S = {ID1, . . . , IDq}, where q ≤ n− 1,
1. Expand the polynomial P[Z] =IDi∈S(Z − IDi) into P[Z] = ρq+1Zq + ρqZq−1 + · · · + ρ2Z + ρ1.
2. Pick s
R← Z∗p and compute
C = (C0, C1, C2) =

M · e(g, g)α·s, g s, h0 · hρ11 · · · hρq+1q+1 s.
I Decrypt(msk, KID, C): parse S as {ID1, . . . , IDq}, the ciphertext C as (C0, C1, C2) and KID as
KID = (K1, K2, T1, . . . , Tn−1) ∈ Gn+1.
1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q} be the position of ID in S. Expand Pi[Z] =IDj∈S\{IDi}(Z − IDj) into
Pi[Z] = y(i)q Zq−1 + y(i)q−1Zq−2 + · · · + y(i)2 Z + y(i)1
and compute (DID, dID) ∈ G2 as
(DID, dID) =

K1 · T y
(i)
1
1 · T y
(i)
2
2 · · · T y
(i)
q
q , K2
 = gα2 · h0 · hρ11 · · · hρq+1q+1 r , g r
where ρ1, . . . , ρq+1 are the coefficients of the polynomial P[Z] (calculated as per step 1 of the encryption algorithm).
2. RecoverM = C0 · e

C1,DID
−1 · eC2, dID.
To explain the first step of the decryption algorithm, one observes that, for any two polynomials (Z − ID) and Pi[Z] =
y(i)q Zq−1 + y(i)q−1Zq−2 + · · · + y(i)2 Z + y(i)1 , the coefficients of their product P[Z] = (Z − ID)Pi[Z] =
q+1
i=1 ρiZ i−1 are given by
ρ⃗ =  ρ1 ρ2 · · · ρq+1 ⊤ = MID · y⃗ =

−ID
1 −ID
1 −ID
. . .
. . .
1 −ID
1
 ·

y(i)1
y(i)2
...
y(i)q
 ,
whereMID ∈ Z(q+1)×qp . Since the latter matrix is such that
M⊤ID · a⃗|q+1 = M⊤ID ·

a1
a2
...
aq+1
 =

a2 − ID · a1
a3 − ID · a2
...
aq+1 − ID · aq
 ,
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for each private key KID, the delegation components satisfy
(T1, . . . , Tq)⊤ =

hr2 · h−ID·r1 , hr3 · h−ID·r2 , . . . , hrq+1 · h−ID·rq
⊤ = g rM⊤1 ·a⃗.
Therefore, since ρ = MID · y⃗, we have
h0 ·
q+1
k=1
hρkk
r
= hr0 · g r·ρ⃗
⊤·a⃗|q+1 = hr0 · g ry⃗
⊤·M⊤ID ·a⃗|q+1 = hr0 · T y
(i)
1
1 · · · T y
(i)
q
q
which explains why (DID, dID) are correctly calculated at step 1 of the decryption algorithm. To explain step 2 of the
decryption algorithm, we note that, for each ID ∈ S, the pair (DID, dID) satisfies
e(DID, g) = e(g, g)α · e(h0 · hρ11 · · · hρq+1q+1 , dID). (B.1)
By raising both members of (B.1) to the power s ∈ Z∗p , where s is the random encryption exponent, we see why M can be
recovered at decryption.
The security of this scheme was proved [12] in the selective-ID model under the n-DBDHE assumption. The construction
is easily seen to fit the general IBBE template.
The security of the (somewhat simpler) IBBE scheme of Section 4.3 under the n-DBDHE assumption follows from the fact
that the underlying inner product encryption scheme can be casted as an instance of the above spatial encryption system.
Indeed, as shown in [4], a vector X⃗ = (x1, . . . , xn)⊤ of key attributes can be mapped onto a (n− 1)-dimension affine space
VX⃗ = Aff(MX⃗ , 0⃗n) = {MX⃗ w⃗ + 0⃗n | w⃗ ∈ Zn−1p }with the matrixMX⃗ ∈ Zn×(n−1)p
MX⃗ =
 − x2x1 − x3x1 · · · − xnx1
In−1

.
From there, it is easy to see that, for any vector Y⃗ = (y1, . . . , yn)⊤, we have the equivalence ⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ = 0 ⇔ Y⃗ ∈ VX⃗ , which
is immediate from
⟨X⃗, Y⃗ ⟩ = 0 ⇔ y1 = y2 ·

−x2
x1

+ · · · + yn ·

−xn
x1

(B.2)
⇔ Y⃗ = MX⃗ · (y2, . . . , yn)⊤ ⇔ Y⃗ ∈ VX⃗ . (B.3)
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